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ABSTRACT
Cybersecurity logs are permanently generated by network devices to describe security incidents. With modern
computing technology, such logs can be exploited to counter threats in real time or before they gain a foothold.
To improve these capabilities, logs are usually shared with external entities. However, since cybersecurity logs
might contain sensitive data, serious privacy concerns arise, even more when critical infrastructures (CI), handling
strategic data, are involved.
We propose a tool to protect privacy by anonymizing sensitive data included in cybersecurity logs. We implement
anonymization mechanisms grouped through the definition of a privacy policy. We adapt said approach to the
context of the EU project CIPSEC that builds a unified security framework to orchestrate security products, thus
offering better protection to a group of CIs. Since this framework collects and processes security-related data from
multiple devices of CIs, our work is devoted to protecting privacy by integrating our anonymization approach.
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INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructures (CIs) are either physical or virtual systems whose operation directly supports the functioning
of a society. In fact, given the wide reach of critical infrastructures, even small problems on their operation could
have a massive impact on a vast population (House 2013). Besides their reach, CIs are tightly coupled with sensitive
areas such as health, telecommunications or economy, which are strategic for a country, so their interruption
might imply severe affectation for citizens (House 2013). We are talking about the infrastructure of hospitals,
transportation systems, oil and energy distribution systems, banking, environment monitoring, etc. Since these
services are essential to the security, prosperity, and social welfare of the population, their corresponding CIs must
not stop working and are usually managed by governments.
Given the importance of CIs, their information systems are usually strongly protected against intrusions, mainly
against those coming from the Internet. Currently, the resources available for such protection involve "intelligent"
cybersecurity solutions that “learn” how attackers behave and ultimately detect and stop future incidents. To do so,
these solutions are fueled with so called logs, i.e., detailed information about past events, which are stored as records
describing every security incident. Furthermore, logs from multiple sources are commonly shared among several
devices and then aggregated so that more input information can improve the efficiency of protection . Aiming to
ensure the continuity of their services, CIs have widely adopted such protection mechanisms that generate very
detailed and vast information about the entities and interactions involved in security incidents.
Although more granular logs provide more intelligent security protection in CIs, inappropriate sharing of sensitive
data may rise serious privacy concerns. Cybersecurity logs could include identifying attributes (IP addresses, user
names, fingerprints, etc.), strategic information of companies (e.g., about vulnerabilities, software versions), and
several other indicators (path names, user data) that, when disclosed, could easily be used to violate the privacy of
the individuals or companies involved. The risk for privacy in this context is not only exacerbated by the increasing
need of security services to aggregate shared cybersecurity data (to get improved protection mechanisms), but also
by the large number of data items enclosed in cybersecurity logs.
Beyond the security they require to protect their information systems, CIs are more exposed to external attacks than
conventional infrastructures due to a number of factors. First, since CIs commonly serve a large population, they
are desired targets of attackers who aim at magnifying the impact of their offensive (Edwards 2018; Moyer 2010).
Also, dealing with strategic processes and information, CIs are usually the target of high-level adversaries supported
by powerful organizations and even governments (Swinford 2018; Woollaston 2017). These factors aggravate even
more the effects of information leakage to the point that, e.g., the mere revealing of internal IP addresses or user
names might imply severe risks for the integrity of such infrastructures. Interestingly then, the privacy of companies
and individuals whose information is revealed in logs may have a direct impact on the security of CIs.
Our work is aimed at preserving the privacy of individuals and organizations in the context of the CIPSEC framework,
and particularly in what involves the sharing of cybersecurity information. The EU project CIPSEC proposes a
unified security framework to orchestrate state-of-the-art heterogeneous, diverse, security products aiming to offer
high levels of cybersecurity protection. To do so, this framework is able to collect and process security-related
data (logs, reports, events) so as to generate security anomaly alerts that can affect a CI health and that can have
cascading effects on other CI systems. Our proposal includes a methodology and a tool (data privacy tool, DPT) for
obfuscating sensitive data from cybersecurity logs to protect the privacy of the involved entities and individuals.
Namely, our DTP will modify sensitive data with the aim of sanitizing or cleaning it from too distinctive attributes.
This involves applying several anonymization mechanisms to cybersecurity logs (suppression, generalization,
pseudonymization) whose implementation will depend on the specific anonymized attributes.
THE CIPSEC FRAMEWORK
CIPSEC objectives
The main objective of the EU project CIPSEC is to create a unified security framework that orchestrates state-of-
the-art heterogeneous, diverse security tools and offers high levels of cybersecurity protection in IT & OT Critical
infrastructure environments. The framework is currently built to collect and process security-related data (logs,
reports, events) so as to generate alerts for security incidents that can affect the integrity of a CI together with the
potential cascading effect affecting other parts of the CI or event other CIs. The framework aims to be very flexible,
adaptable and causing minimum interference to the normal operations of the CI, allowing for its easy updating
when needed in a secure and easy manner.
The CIPSEC framework is capable of collecting events supported by different tools that monitor different aspects of
the CI, such as network traffic, malware threats or wireless spectrum among others. Along with the operations for
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collecting events there is also a reasoning capability based on correlation algorithms that generate alerts for the
anomalies detected in the events collected. Additionally, the CIPSEC framework provides with additional services,
transverse to the CI monitoring activity, which complements the activities carried out:
• vulnerability tests and recommendations, including cascading effect attacks; which allows to have a snapshot
of the level of protection against cyber threats exploiting current vulnerabilities of the assets within a CI ;
• security information sharing, leveraging the report of security incidents either across the infrastructure or to
the rest of the world, in order to, for instance, prevent incidents propagation;
• training services, assisting on the usage of the framework and on different characteristics of security
management aspects, allowing for an easy training of security staff in the context of the CIPSEC framework;
• updating and patching mechanisms, with the purpose of having a unified view of the status of all the
monitoring tools deployed in the infrastructure and giving the possibility to automatically update them,
guaranteeing the timely protection against the latest security threats.
The CIPSEC framework is being validated in real environments using the infrastructure of three pilots that covers
different domains: rail transportation, environmental monitoring and health sector.
CIPSEC architecture
For the sake of flexibility, the CIPSEC framework was designed to be independent from the underlying critical
infrastructure (i.e., independent from the resources managed or the security requirements). The reference architecture
of CIPSEC was conceived based on the flow of the data managed within a CI, or, said otherwise, was design to
be infrastructure-agnostic by design. With this aim, the architecture is defined according to the life cycle of the
security data (logs, events, reports) acquired, disseminated and consumed in CIs.
Data Acquisition refers to the process of collecting or storing the information (logs, events) generated by end
devices devoted to secure the integrity of CIs. Thus, there are multiple sources of this data, e.g., intrusion detection
systems.
Data Dissemination covers the transmission of the acquired security information to the components that will
further process it. The dissemination of this data is usually performed in real-time describing the multiple processes
carrying out in a CI, so that they can be monitored and controlled. In the context of CIPSEC, the information
disseminated encompasses security data related to events, alarms, updates, etc.
Data Consumption concerns the processing of the acquired security information after being disseminated to
the relevant consumers (e.g., incident correlators). Such information is processed and interpreted to fuel several
assessment tools that enable users to make informed decisions.
Figure 1 depicts the architecture of the CIPSEC framework based on a group of layers that follow the flow of
security data described above. This illustration also shows how the security data travels from the CI to a user
interface so that the system admin can take appropriate decisions based in the processing activities carried out by
the framework, such as enforcing mitigations or applying contingency plans.
The acquisition layer obtains a lot of information directly from the CI components dedicated such as vulnerability
assessment, identity access management, integrity management, endpoint detection and response, and cryptography.
The information collected is aggregated and processed by a component called anomaly detection reasoner that
triggers security alerts depending on the patterns devised in security data.
The data processing layer is on top of the acquisition layer and involves two main components: the DPT and the
forensics service. While the forensics filters and analyzes indicators potentially useful for forensic analysis, the DPT
aims at preserving privacy in the security data coming from the CI and at storing such sanitized data in a different
database for sharing purposes. This component is the one whose implementation we present in this paper.
The presentation layer aggregates the information produced by the underlying layers through a dashboard that offers
a user interface where statistics and evolution indicators are presented to illustrate the security status of the whole
CI. Such interface provides with an aggregated and uniform view of this status to the user in order to facilitate
decision-making processes.
Finally, other complementary services are also provided by the architecture in order to guarantee the support to end
users, the compliance with the CIPSEC framework, and the continuity of the services.
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Figure 1. CIPSEC Reference Architecture for protecting of critical infrastructures.
DATA PRIVACY TOOL
Background on cybersecurity logs and privacy protection mechanisms
Logs are pieces of information that sequentially register the events affecting a system; therefore, when seen
aggregated, they constitute evidence of the system behavior. Said diagnosis is fundamental to scrutinize and then
fix a given issue, even more in the cybersecurity realm where thousands of attackers are permanently generating
incidents that threaten the integrity of critical systems connected to the Internet.
Usually, logs contain a lot of granular information on the related event, starting with a time stamp. Cybersecurity
logs may include, e.g., IP addresses, process IDs, hardware information and event descriptions.This information is
stored in text files formatted to guarantee its agile reading and processing. For instance, two formats extensively
used to store logs are XML and JSON. Both have interesting features based on labels to present information as
name-value pairs, e.g., “ID: 123456” or “Alarm type: critical”. Namely, the attributes or information elements of a
log are organized using a name (or label) of the attribute and its corresponding value (the raw data). This way of
representing information in logs significantly facilitates further selection and replacement (transform) of sensitive
attributes.
Roughly speaking, protecting said information against privacy threats builds on these two operations: selection
of sensitive attributes in the logs and transformation of corresponding values to a more private version. This
is more deeply described in this document, where our proposal is presented. Although the definition of said
operations depend on the context (sharing policies, organization concerns, etc.), the modern ways to structure logs
are decreasing the complexity of performing these operations of selection (search) and transform (replace).
First, to protect privacy, sensitive attributes (the target) must be defined and then detected in logs. In practice, this
task consists in searching for specific information in plain text. Given the vast log data that cybersecurity systems
could generate, such searching for specific items might be daunting if it is expected to be done manually by a human
operator. Fortunately, technology can now be used to automatize the detection of this type of attributes. Moreover,
the most common logging formats are based on labeling every single piece of information contained in the log.
Thus, once the sensitive attribute (or its label) is defined, it is not difficult to retrieve it from the logs along with its
value. If the data within logs were not appropriately formatted, sensitive information should be located by looking
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for specific syntax patterns that such information present in logs. For instance, if IP addresses were considered as
sensitive information, the privacy protecting approach could start detecting IP addresses in logs by resorting to its
unambiguous syntax. Then, searching for a pattern of four numbers separated by dots would eventually lead the
system to find said IP addresses. Regular expressions are powerful constructions that can be used to represent and
search such patterns.
After finding the attribute in cybersecurity logs, it has to be protected to preserve the privacy of involved companies
or individuals. This implies modifying or transforming the value of the attribute to obfuscate any sensitive
information there contained. This task is also referred to as sanitization in the sense that it “cleans” data from
too distinctive attributes. To do so, some anonymization or sanitization mechanisms are commonly implemented.
These mechanisms are described in the following lines.
Suppression is the simplest strategy to protect privacy in this context. It consists in completely eliminating sensitive
information, which can be interpreted as replacing it for a blank or any meaningless string. This implies that no
trace of said sensitive data is left which may directly affect the utility of the logs.
Generalization is rather a less destructive anonymization approach. It builds on replacing sensitive information
with more general but still meaningful data. For instance, if the sensitive piece of data is the IP address 192.168.1.1,
a generalized version would be 192.168.0.0. In contrast with suppression, generalization could keep some utility
from the data in log records, depending on the deep of generalization attained.
Pseudonymization is a mechanism that consists in replacing identifying information by artificial identifiers, also
called pseudonymous. Since said pseudonymous would be used instead of the original identifier, each time the latter
appears, it is possible in practice to recover the original information from its pseudonymized version. Also, if such
identifiers are only used for identifying purposes, pseudonymizing them would not affect the utility of information.
As briefly described, the resulting utility of cybersecurity logs may be more or less affected depending on the
anonymization mechanism used to protect privacy.
Privacy risks from disclosing cybersecurity logs
In general, logs contain a lot of information since they are aimed at describing the state of a system at a given point
in time. Further, an aggregated set of logs should enable an administrator to have a general view of the performance
of said system. In particular, the specific amount of data items (we will call them attributes) present in a log record
will depend on the level of granularity set in the logging service. Interestingly, some equipment, e.g., networking
devices, allow to be configured with such high levels of granularity that manufacturers explicitly warn about the risk
of saturating storage or processing resources. Thus, logs could become extremely detailed pieces of data describing
a system where companies and individuals are involved.
Cybersecurity logs might include very sensitive data since they are commonly associated with vulnerabilities and
security threats. If that information fell into the wrong hands, it could cause severe damage to the data owners.
Besides, the level of granularity of security logs is usually higher to afterwards enable the detection of security
breaches (which use to be provoked by undercover interactions), so more and more attributes are included in logs to
improve protection to the same extent. As a consequence, the potential leakage of this information implies serious
privacy risks for the entities involved, not only due to the weaknesses that such logs could reveal to attackers, but
also due to the increased detail of the information.
Ironically, the risk of leaking this information does not necessarily come from deliberate attacker intrusions to steal
it, but from the voluntary release of such logs when sharing them to other partners. In fact, sharing cybersecurity
logs has become a common practice among organizations as a collaboration mechanism to enhance the effectiveness
in detecting and preventing security threats. The attributes characterizing a security incident in a system, e.g., IP
addresses, file names, sizes, can be shared with system administrators with the aim to help other systems detect or
prevent related threats. More specifically, information sharing enables sharing partners to enhance their defensive
capabilities, i.e., detecting, responding, and recovering from cybersecurity incidents. As a matter of fact, the
collective aggregation of shared security logs is currently the main input fueling powerful antivirus and network
security devices.
Despite the great benefits that sharing cybersecurity logs may bring, some challenges still remain. One of said
challenges is safeguarding sensitive information that might be included in these logs, i.e., protecting the privacy of
the entities whose information is shared. The violation of privacy in this context (e.g., due to the disclosure of
personally identifiable information) may have serious consequences, particularly for companies, such as the ones
listed below:
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Table 1. Some attributes whose disclosure in cybersecurity logs might jeopardize privacy.
Attribute Privacy risk
IP address May enable identification of users and organizations.
e-mail address May enable identification of users and organizations.
path names Could disclose user names, directory hierarchies.
patching information Could reveal software updating calendars, thus when
software versions Along with other attributes, could enable fingerprinting and identification of users.
incident description When associated with an origanization, could unveil its vulnerabilities.
organization name May allow attackers to identify an organization.
• financial loss,
• legal action,
• loss of reputation,
• exposure to protection capabilities.
As explained above, the nature of cybersecurity information contained in logs is inherently sensitive since it includes
several attributes and also some very punctual data items that may reveal strategic operations of systems regarding
their security. Virtually every computing device and application are enabled to generate this type information,
especially if they engage networking or Web interactions. Some examples of sensitive information that could be
included in cybersecurity logs are described next.
Timestamp. A time stamp is fundamental to determine the moment when an security incident occurred. The exact
date and time of the incident allow to correlate other events that could contribute on the investigation of the threat.
However, if coupled, e.g., with individuals, temporal data could also help attackers perform the same correlation to
unveil patterns (a person’s sleep time, a company’s patching calendar) to violate privacy.
IP address. IP addresses individuate devices so that security issues can be associated with the entity where the
incident has been generated. Nevertheless, in the same line, IP addresses are key information for privacy attackers to
identify the individuals and companies involved. In fact, an IP address could unequivocally represent an individual
or a family, so the security logs related to their interactions would reveal such tight association. The mere availability
of this information enables further security attacks (denial of service, fingerprinting) to companies, which could
reveal even more indicators about potential victims (privacy violations).
IP addresses are not the only data items with this individuating capability. Other attributes that may appear in
security logs such as user names, host names and MAC addresses have similar identification capabilities, although
their presence is not as common as IP addresses. There are also apparently innocuous indicators that are contained
in cybersecurity logs that can serve as identifying parameters when combined, e.g., software version and patch level
information, hardware information, system event, file access, etc. Interestingly, the resulting combination of said
attributes can be seen as a fingerprint of the associated entity and could be used as an identifier by itself.
Any indicator or attribute included in logs could reveal further sensitive information. The specific privacy risk,
however, depends on the context, i.e., on the background information available for the attacker, and his objective, but
also on the particular status of the potential victim. For example, path names could disclose information about the
work a user might be performing, or operating system and patches names may reveal the preferences of a company
regarding their network or software implementation (which it had been keeping secret). Disclosing such information
in logs that will be shared may represent a privacy violation for users or the company whether or not the parameters
included are critical for each entity.
Besides identifying attributes or other complementary indicators, the information included in cybersecurity logs
may be very specific when generated by specialized devices such as routers, antivirus servers, intrusion protection
systems, forensic toolkits, SIEMs (security information and event management systems), etc. Moreover, these logs
contain very critical information since it is commonly derived from assessment routines, i.e., contemplates “refined
data” (which in practical terms implies more and more valuable data). This information might span vulnerability
alerts, system artifacts, attack alerts, or summary reports, whose disclosure is a direct threat for the privacy of the
entities involved.
The risk to privacy when sharing cybersecurity logs is seriously exacerbated when CIs are involved since the
corresponding entities and their workers are more exposed given the strategic role they are playing. In Table 1, we
describe some attributes whose disclosure in cybersecurity logs may imply serious privacy risks.
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Data Privacy Tool
TARGET
Description
CONTEXT
Definition
TRANSFORMATION
By keyword SRC_IP
By pattern H.H.H.H
By value 1.1.1.1
WHAT is sensitive? WHEN is this sensitive?     PROTECT sensitive info
originally,
SRC_IP: 1.1.1.1
apply when
organization: hospital SRC_IP: 1.1.*.*
• Suppression
• Generalization
• Pseudonymization
an IP address by organization by obfuscating info
Figure 2. Architecture of the data privacy tool.
Architecture of the data privacy tool
The objective of our DPT is offering privacy for individuals and institutions in a context where cybersecurity
logs have to be shared among different partners. While disclosing and aggregating such data may improve the
capabilities of security solutions in CIs, the high granularity of logs and the sensitive attributes there contained may
jeopardize privacy. Thus, we devise a tool to protect this sensitive data by anonymizing it. This tool encompasses
the components described below.
Target description
The first step in protecting privacy in cybersecurity logs is determining the set of sensitive attributes that will have
to be sanitized. Said otherwise, the specific target of the anonymization mechanisms has to be defined since logs
use to hold a lot of information.
The level of sensitivity, however, depends on the specific context in which users and companies perform (their
interests, needs, worries, adversaries, etc.). Moreover, although some attributes might be defined as sensitive by
default (e.g., identity numbers), or automatic mechanisms could be created to “recognize” them, the operators of
the DPT should always have the last word when deciding what attributes to protect by defining a privacy policy.
Evidently then, to locate sensitive attributes and their values within the data provided by logs, some language might
be necessary for the user to describe the corresponding targets. If logs were generated by CIs without any visible
structure, patterns should be found to detect the sensitive attribute, e.g., looking for quartets of decimal numbers
separated by commas to find IP addresses (which the operator would have defined as sensitive). Fortunately, to
facilitate its exploitation and analysis, logs are commonly generated in structured formats, sometimes even in
hierarchical trees, such that the information be organized according to certain logic and that every attribute value is
labeled.
As logs are presented through standard approaches and attribute values are indexed through labels, it is straightforward
to refer to such attributes to then retrieve their values. For instance, let us suppose that the operator is interested
in preventing individuation of his company in the logs generated by their devices. Thus, he might have to detect
identifying data in logs, such as IP addresses, to anonymize them and protect privacy. There may be different
approaches to search for IP addresses in a log, as described below.
• By keyword. Within cybersecurity logs, IP addresses are usually labeled with a keyword such as SRC_IP
(source IP) or DST_IP (destination IP) or any other. Knowing such keyword, it is pretty easy to obtain the
sensitive value associated in the corresponding log.
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{'AlarmEvent’: {
'USERNAME': '', 'SRC_IP': '188.112.63.117', 'BACKLOG_ID':'839301cfd5b54179847535ffa3e29adc', 'DATE': '2018-07-17 09:00:16’, 
'DST_IP': '84.88.67.117', 'USERDATA7': '', 'USERDATA6': '','FILENAME': '', 'PRIORITY': 4, 'RELIABILITY': 10, 'ORGANIZATION': ‘hospital', 'SENSOR': 'AD14C6F3975ED9860E32190EA3DF2535', 'SID_NAME': 'directive_event: Detected access to SAMBA in Honeypot','USERDATA2': '', 'USERDATA3': '', 'USERDATA1': 'tcp', 'PROTOCOL': 6, 'RISK': 4, 'USERDATA4': '', 'USERDATA5': '', 'EVENT_ID': '04447d36c0614e3fbe70b5b4612adf2e', 'USERDATA8':'', 'USERDATA9': '', 'PLUGIN_NAME': 'cyber-monitor', 'DST_IP_HOSTNAME': '00000000', 'RELATED_EVENTS': '[899f11e885a4080027ea052cd289c2dc,899f11e885a4080027ea052cd2b27c90]', 'PASSWORD': '', 'PLUGIN_SID': '2', 'CATEGORY': 'Recon', 'SRC_IP_HOSTNAME': '00000000', 'SUBCATEGORY': 'Scanner}
Figure 3. Sample of logs generated by the CIPSEC framework.
• By pattern. If the sensitive data to be anonymized is not systematically associated with an index or label, a
pattern could be used to look for such data. In the IP address example, e.g., we could look for any group of
four numbers from 0 to 255 separated by dots, which could be symbolically represented as X.X.X.X.
• By value. Still in the case when no specific keyword is available, the value of the sensitive attribute could be
directly searched in the logs. The drawback of this approach is evidently that this search spans a single value
while the firs two may encompass a wider spectrum of values.
Since the first step to protect privacy in cybersecurity logs involves searching for a string (keyword, pattern or
value) in a piece of text, it is worth noting that, at an implementation level, the use of regular expressions is highly
recommended for such tasks. See Figure 2 where this component of target description of our DPT is depicted as it
would work with the other two components described in the next subsections.
Context definition
As stated in the previous section, the sensitivity of some data item is subject to the context where its owner
performs. In the same line, the privacy protection mechanism required will vary according to the specific needs and
characteristics of the subjects involved. The context-definition component then enables the user of our DPT to set
any restriction or condition on the application of the privacy protection strategy.
While a lot of restrictions could be integrated, there is one in which we are interested for the CIPSEC framework.
Since three different pilots or organizations are sharing their cybersecurity logs, the user of the DPT could opt for
anonymization or not depending on the organization he belongs to. For instance, air quality monitoring might not
involve sensitive attributes for the organization generating such data so could decide not anonymizing their data.
Other more complex scenarios may be characterized, e.g., by a company having very specific needs on anonymizing
attributes that in other contexts might not be critical to protect. In brief, the scope in which our DTP is used may
also define the operation of the DPT.
In Figure 2, we illustrate this component within the whole architecture of this tool.
Transformation
Once sensitive information and context are defined, sensitive data has to be transformed in order to protect privacy.
Said transformation implies perturbing attribute values so that, e.g., identifiers no longer serve to identify individuals,
or that sensitive values provide less specific information regarding individuals or companies.
The transformation component in the architecture of our DPT is implemented through the anonymizationmechanisms
described in Section 3.1. As explained above, such mechanisms will replace the original sensitive value with another
(at least less specific) string. Figure 2 shows how this component is integrated in the architecture of our DPT.
It is worth noting that when transformation has to be done dynamically (i.e., when replacing according to a a
predefined pattern), regular expressions are also very useful as with target description.
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Example of Policies (policies.json)
"SRCIP":{
"ORGANIZATION":"all",
"ACTION":"generalization",
"TYPE":"ip_address",
"KRE":"^SRC_IP$",
"VRE":"",
"SRE":""
},
"USERDATA":{
"ORGANIZATION":"all",
"ACTION":"suppression",
"KRE":"^USERDATA*",
"VRE":"",
"SRE":""
},
"ORG":{
"ORGANIZATION":"hospital",
"ACTION":"pseudonymization",
"TYPE":"organization",
"KRE":"^ORGANIZATION$",
"VRE":"",
"SRE":""
}
Figure 4. Sample of policies defined in JSON format.Data Privacy Tool Interactions
DPTXL‐SIEM(from ATOS)
Dashboard
policies.json
Policy A
Policy B
Policy C
scope
log anon log
MISP
Figure 5. Interactions of the DPT with different components of the CIPSEC framework.
Privacy policies
In order to enable users to set the context of their privacy protection, a privacy policy has to be defined. A privacy
policy is essentially a list of named rules that include the parameters that characterize the anonymization of sensitive
information, i.e., the description of the specific attribute to be anonymized, the transformation mechanism to use,
and any other criterion (e.g., the organization whose logs will be anonymized).
IMPLEMENTATION AND INTEGRATION IN THE CIPSEC FRAMEWORK
As explained throughout this article, cybersecurity logs enable the intelligent protection provided by the CIPSEC
framework. Meanwhile, our DPT aims at preserving the privacy of individuals and organizations involved in such
logs when shared among different partners. All the logs generated by several security devices in the CIPSEC
infrastructure are aggregated and formatted in standard JSON format in real time to then be stored in a security
information and event management server (XL-SIEM). Figure 3 depicts a sample of these logs that are further
available for sharing in a Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP).
As mentioned in Section 3, our DPT has three main inputs that guide the anonymization process: the cybersecurity
logs that are fueled by the XL-SIEM; a privacy policy, also as a file formatted in JSON (an example is depicted
in Figure 4); and a scope that indicates the organization that is executing the anonymization process. The latter
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argument enables the user to anonymize only the logs that belong to his organization. After logs are anonymized,
they are sent to the MISP for sharing purposes.
Finally, for the sake of usability, the control of the execution of the DPT and the selection of the privacy policy is
delegated to a graphical user interface integrated in the dashboard of the CIPSEC framework. Figure 5 illustrates
the components mentioned in this section and their corresponding interactions, while Figure 6 shows how a single
anonymized log record would look. As a side note, our DPT is implemented using Python.
Related work
The concerns on the privacy risks from cybersecurity data are not new. The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) of the USA already reports in (High risk series: An update. Ensuring the security of federal information
systems and cyber critical infrastructure and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information 2015) how
the advances in technology have given rise to important challenges to ensure the privacy of personally identifiable
information. The GAO recommends implementing privacy practices to protect personal identifying information,
especially when managed in critical infrastructures. But in a wider scope, severe regulation is currently been applied
in the USA and Europe (General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016) to protect privacy at every context,
essentially by given users great control over their data. Though these documents acknowledge the increasing need
to protect privacy, they are regulatory approaches that require implementation according to the specific domain.
Several approaches can be found in the literature that describe privacy preserving mechanisms on unstructured data
(e.g., any type of log data). Those mechanisms are based on sanitization (through suppression, generalization, or
any kind of perturbation) of such data. Some works address related mechanisms (Sánchez and Batet 2015), not only
focused on protecting privacy but also on preserving the utility of sanitized data (Sánchez, Batet, and Viejo 2014).
Interestingly, some of such approaches even consider the semantics of the text to be sanitized to get more efficient
mechanisms (Sánchez, Batet, and Viejo 2013; Chakaravarthy et al. 2008). Unlike those works, our approach focuses
on privacy preserving within cybersecurity data in the particular context of the CIPSEC framework.
With regards to the exchange of threat information several initiatives are exploiting their possibilities. For example,
the DiSIEM project 1 uses it to empower Security Information and Event Management systems by exporting and
importing data about incidents detected, allowing for the update of detection rules according to the information
imported. DiSIEM also uses MISP as platform for the exchange of information although the privacy considerations
are something not considered so far. Also, in 5G networks it is considered the usage of Threat Intelligence Exchange
capabilities to import and export incident information across the network slices considered in 5G infrastructures 2.
CONCLUSIONS
Cybersecurity data generated in the form of logs is very prone to including sensitive information about individuals
and organizations, even more so when such logs belong to CIs. The strategic importance of such data, then, makes
those individuals and organizations common targets of privacy adversaries. The EU project CIPSEC integrates the
cybersecurity information systems of three CIs to improve their threat detection and reaction capabilities. However,
since this integration involves sharing such cybersecurity data, there are privacy risks that must be tackled.
The solution we propose addresses this issue by pre-processing logs to anonymize sensitive attributes according
to a privacy policy that defines a particular context. Enabling users to set privacy policies is definitely the most
important and complicated task since many factors have to be considered to define not only what data to anonymize,
but also when and how. Fortunately, the logs generated by information systems are currently represented using
more structured and flexible formats (e.g., JSON), which, along with the power of regular expressions to define
context, significantly facilitate matching and dynamically perturbing string-based attributes.
As a work in progress, there are several avenues to enhance our privacy tool. Perhaps the most important pending
work has to do with assessing the impact of the anonymization mechanisms on the practical utility of cybersecurity
logs. Undoubtedly, data perturbing strategies reduce the quality of of the information involved so a balance must be
reached to protect privacy while minimizing utility loss. Moreover, standardization of the definition of privacy
policies is necessary to simplify the configuration of the anonymization mechanisms. This could be a daunting task
so automating it according to the requirements of users and organizations might certainly help. Furthermore, a
challenge in data sanitization is the reidentification risk posed by inferences based on several attributes exploited
simultaneously. Finally, in the same line, more usable (probably graphical) interfaces could be developed to enable
end users to provide the parameters of a personalized context in order to better guide the anonymization process of
cybersecurity logs.
1DiSIEM project web page: http://disiem-project.eu/
2D3.1. Initial resilience and security analysis: http://5g-monarch.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/5G-MoNArch_761445_D3.
1_Initial_resilience_and_security_analysis_v1.0.pdf
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AlarmEvent: {
USERNAME: “**********”,
SRC_IP: “187.62.X.X”,
BACKLOG_ID: “360ce19b0da047e”,
DATE: “2018-10-08 14:40:04”,
DST_IP: “**********”,
RELIABILITY: “10”,
ORGANIZATION: “pilot3”,
SID_NAME: “directive_evento”,
USERDATA2: “**********”,
PROTOCOL: “6”,
RISK: “4”,
EVENT_ID: “37ddfcc89e6448d2ae”,
PLUGIN_NAME: “**********”,
RELATED_EVENTS: “[cb0811,cb0812]”,
CATEGORY: “Recon”,
SUBCATEGORY: “Scanner”,
...
AlarmEvent: {
USERNAME: “”,
SRC_IP: “187.62.178.34”,
BACKLOG_ID: “360ce19b0da047e”,
DATE: “2018-10-08 14:40:04”,
DST_IP: “84.88.67.117”,
RELIABILITY: “10”,
ORGANIZATION: “hospital”,
SID_NAME: “directive_evento”,
USERDATA2: “”,
PROTOCOL: “6”,
RISK: “4”,
EVENT_ID: “37ddfcc89e6448d2ae”,
PLUGIN_NAME: “cyber-monitor”
RELATED_EVENTS: “[cb0811,cb0812]”,
CATEGORY: “Recon”,
SUBCATEGORY: “Scanner”,
...
SUPPRESSION
SUPPRESSION
SUPPRESSION
SUPPRESSION
GENERALIZATION
PSEUDONYMIZATION
Before and after Anonymization
Figure 6. A view on how the privacy in cybersecurity logs could be protected through different anonymization
mechanisms.
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